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SUPREME 

COURT WATCH 

By Reginald C. Oh 
In its 2003-04 Term, the U.S. Supreme Court, in an at­tempt to clarify its First Amendment jurisprudence on the religion clauses, handed down its decision in Locke v. 
Davey, No. 02-1315, 2004 WL 344123 (U.S. Feb. 25, 2004). 
In a 7-2 decision, the Court held that the State ofWashing­
ton did not violate the First Amendment Free Exercise 
Clause by denying government financial aid to college stu­
dents seeking to pursue a course of study in religious devo­
tional studies. 
In clarifying its free exercise jurisprudence, the Court in 
Davey properly held that the mere fact that a law facially dis­
criminates against religion should not automatically render 
the law presumptively unconstitutional and therefore trigger 
heightened judicial review. This holding is consistent with 
the Court's institutional role to not intervene into state po­
litical processes unless the state is significantly burdening and 
infringing upon fundamental constitutional rights. In other 
words, under Davey, the fact that a statute facially discrimi­
nates against religion does not, by itse!f, create a constitution­
ally cognizable burden on the right to freely exercise religion. 
At issue in this case was the State of Washington's 
"Promise Scholarship Program," which was established in 
1999 to provide financial assistance to gifted low-income 
students pursuing a postsecondary education. The program 
provides students who meet certain eligibility requirements 
with scholarships, renewable for one year, which students can 
use to defray postsecondary education-related expenses. The 
scholarships are funded through the state's general fund and 
the amount varies from year to year. For the academic year 
1999-2000, the scholarship was worth $1,125. For the acad­
emic year 2000--01, the scholarship was worth $1,542. Under 
the program, students are eligible for the scholarship if they 
meet certain academic, income, and enrollment require­
ments. The program even permits students who are eligible 
to receive a Promise Scholarship to attend a religiously affili-
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ated private institution ofhigher education. 
The program, however, prohibits otherwise eligible students 
from receiving a Promise Scholarship ifthey decide to pursue a 
course ofstudy in religious devotional studies. The statute states, 
"No aid shall be awarded to any student who is pursuing a de­
gree in theology."WASH. REV. CODE § 28B.10.814 (1997). Al­
though the term "a degree in theology" is not defined in the 
statute, the statute codifies the Washington Constitution's own 
Establishment Clause, which states, "No public money or prop­
erty shall be appropriated for or applied to any religious wor­
ship, exercise or instruction, or the support ofany religious es­
tablishment." WASH. CONST. art. I,§ 11. 
Respondent Joshua Davey, a Promise Scholar recipient, 
enrolled at Northwest College to pursue a double-major in 
pastoral ministries and business management/administra­
tion. Northwest College is a private, religiously affiliated 
school. At the beginning of the 1999-2000 academic year, 
Davey was informed by the school's director offinancial aid 
that he could not use his scholarship ifhe decided to pursue 
a major in religious devotional studies. He was told that in 
order to receive his scholarship funds, he must sign a form 
stating that he would not be pursuing a degree in devotional 
studies at the school. He refused to sign the form and was de­
nied the scholarship. 
Davey then brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 al­
leging that the denial ofhis scholarship based on his decision 
to pursue a pastoral ministries major violated the First 
Amendment Establishment, Free Exercise, and Free Speech 
Clauses, and that it violated the Fourteenth Amendment 
Equal Protection Clause. The district court rejected his con­
stitutional claims, but on appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed 
and held that Washington's statute denying public funds to 
students pursuing devotional studies violated the Free Exer­
cise Clause. The State ofWashington appealed the decision 
to the U.S. Supreme Court, and the Court granted certiorari. 
The Court held that Washington's statute did not violate 
the Free Exercise Clause. In an opinion written by ChiefJus­
tice Rehnquist, the Court framed the issue as one involving 
a tension or "play in the joints" between the command of the 
Establishment Clause and the protections of the Free Exer­
cise Clause. The conflict arises when a state's attempt to avoid 
an establishment ofreligion seemingly discriminates against 
religion and arguably burdens the right to freely exercise reli­
gion. Thus, in Davey, respondent Davey argued that the 
State ofWashington, in denying scholarships to people pur­
suing religious devotional studies, infringed upon his right 
to freely exercise religion. The State ofWashington respond­
ed that it had to exclude funding religious studies in order to 
prevent an establishment of religion breach according to the 
state's constitution. 
Although the state could have decided to fund religious 
studies without violating the federal Establishment Clause, 
see Witters v. Washington Dep't ofServicesfar the Blind, 474 
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U.S. 481 (1989), the question before the Court in Davey was 
whether the State ofWashington could follow the command 
of its own more restrictive establishment clause and deny 
public funding of religious studies without running afoul of 
the federal Free Exercise Clause. 
The Court concluded that the State ofWashington may 
properly exclude religious studies from its scholarship pro­
gram without violating the Free Exercise Clause, even 
though the program facially discriminates with respect to re­
ligion. For the Court, there were two key factors that it used 
to conclude that the State ofWashington did not violate the 
Free Exercise Clause: first, the Court emphasized that the 
program created minimal burdens on the right to freely ex­
ercise religion, and second, the Court concluded that the 
State ofWashington did not act with animus toward religion 
and religious groups in excluding religious training studies 
from its scholarship program. 
The Court concluded that Washington's statute did not 
create significant burdens on the right offree exercise. The 
Court distinguished the state's denial ofpublic funding for re­
ligious studies from the law in Church efLukumi BabaluAye, 
Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993), which the Court held was 
unconstitutional because it unreasonably burdened religious 
rights by making it a crime to engage in certain forms ofritu­
alistic animal slaughter. In that case, the Court reasoned that 
the criminal prohibition against animal slaughter suppressed a 
practice central to that ofa particular religion, and therefore 
the Court concluded that the law not only facially discrimi­
nated against religion, but it also created an unreasonable bur­
den on the right to freely exercise religion. 
In contrast, in Davey, the Court emphasized that Wash­
ington's law denying scholarships to students pursuing reli­
gious devotional studies has only a "minimal" burden on reli­
gious rights. The program's exclusion does not impose any 
criminal or civil sanctions on a religious rite, as did the law in 
Lukumi. Moreover, the law does not absolutely deny or de­
prive a person a right or entitlement based on his or her reli­
gious beliefs or course of religious study. The student is still 
free to pursue his choice of study, but in doing so, he or she 
may not receive government funding to subsidize his choice. 
Second, the Court emphasized that the program's exclu­
sion of religious studies does not indicate the state's hostility 
or animus toward religion or religious groups. The state's de­
sire to treat training for religious professions differently from 
training for secular professions reflects the state's goal ofpre­
serving a strict separation between the state and religion, 
rather than an overt hostility toward religion. This conclusion 
was supported by the fact that, overall, the Promise Scholar­
ship Program "goes a long way toward including religion in 
its benefits." For example, the Court noted that the program 
permits scholarships to be granted to students attending 
"pervasively religious schools," and that a student like Davey 
could still take devotional theology courses even if they may 
not study theology as majors. 
Thus, the Court concluded that mere facial discrimina­
tion ofreligion does not automatically give rise to a presump­
tion of unconstitutionality. Rather, to determine whether a 
law that facially discriminates on the basis ofreligion should 
be subject to strict scrutiny for purposes offree exercise doc­
trine, the Court effectively held that it must conduct a two­
part inquiry into (1) whether the facially discriminatory law 
unreasonably burdens the right of religious expression and 
(2) whether the law reflects hostility or animus against reli­
gion or religious groups. In Davey, the Court concluded that 
the Promise Scholarship Program's exclusion offunding for 
religious studies did not burden the right of religious expres­
sion and was not motivated by animus toward religion. Ac­
cordingly, the law was not presumed to be unconstitutional, 
and the Court reviewed the Scholarship Program under ra­
tional basis review rather than under strict scrutiny review. 
Justice Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion, an opinion 
joined by Justice Clarence Thomas. Justice Scalia contended 
that the program violated the Free Exercise Clause because 
it facially discriminates against religion, and because the state 
has no compelling interest to justify its discrimination. For 
Justice Scalia, the key to a free exercise analysis is whether the 
law facially discriminates against religion. Ifa law is not fa­
cially neutral with respect to religion, Justice Scalia contends 
that, under Lukumi, the Court must apply strict scrutiny to 
determine the constitutionality of the law. Under strict 
scrutiny analysis, Justice Scalia concluded that the law was 
not narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest. 
The law singled out religion for denial of funding, and he 
could find no compelling interest to justify such discrimina­
tion against religion. 
Justice Scalia characterized the paradigmatic harm that 
the Free Exercise Clause seeks to protect as the dignitary 
harm caused by "being singled out for special burdens on the 
basis ofone's religious calling ... ."Davey, 2004 WL 344123 
at 8. He called such a dignitary burden "so profound that the 
concrete harm produced can never be dismissed as insubstan­
tial." Id. Justice Scalia's reasoning is consistent with his rea­
soning in equal protection jurisprudence dealing with racial 
classifications. In fact, he even cites to Brown v. BoardifEd­
ucation, 347 U.S.483 (1954) (holding that public schools seg­
regated on the basis ofrace violates equal protection), to sup­
port his proposition that facial discrimination, whether on 
the basis of race or religion, by itself creates a constitutional­
ly cognizable harm, regardless ofwhether or not the law ac­
tually has a significant burden on fundamental rights. 
Essentially, Justice Scalia seems to consider the abstract, 
formal "dignitary harm" caused anytime the state facially dis­
criminates on the basis of religion as being the central con­
cern ofthe Free Exercise Clause. Yet, curiously, he is less con­
cerned about whether the right to freely exercise religion is 
actually harmed or burdened by facially discriminatory or fa­
cially neutral government regulations. For example, he wrote 
the majority decision in Employment Div., Dep't efHuman 
Res. ifOregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), in which the 
Court held that a facially neutral law with general application 
does not implicate the Free Exercise Clause even if the ef­
fect ofthe law is to substantially interfere with religious prac­
tices and beliefs. 
continued on page 15 
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Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion, however, effectively 
rebuts Justice Scalia's contention that a facially discriminato­
ry law presumptively creates a dignitary burden on religion. 
The Court emphasized that Washington's Promise Program 
was not borne out of animus toward religion and religious 
groups, especially since the program permits students to at­
tend religiously affiliated schools and still receive a Promise 
scholarship. The lack of animus toward religion on the State 
ofWashington's part minimizes any concern that the law's 
purpose or effect is to demean religion in any significant way. 
In other words, the majority concluded that any dignitary 
harm caused by application of a facially discriminatory law 
does not arise from the mere fact that a law facially discrimi­
nates, but arises only if the discrimination is a manifestation 
of the state's animus or hostility to religion. Thus, although 
Washington's program discriminates against religion, it does 
not invidiously discriminate against religion, and therefore 
the majority in Davey concluded that the program does not 
truly give rise to substantial free exercise dignitary harms that 
required its invalidation. 
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